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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to determine how the building of Shenyang Jianzhu
University’s new campus was accomplished under the leadership of Professor Fuchang
Zhang, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party for the university, using his
Communist Party network. This study was conducted in the city of Shenyang, Liaoning
Province, Peoples Republic of China, using interviews with Professor Zhang, his peers,
government officials, and other university presidents. Archival data is also included.
There were limitations in the study that included personal and professional friendships,
student recruiting issues, as well as methodological limitations because all interviews had
to be translated from Mandarin into English and transcribed. The study surrounds the
controversy of a proposed move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from its old campus to
its new campus. There were university faculty, government officials, as well as other
university presidents who resisted such a move based on government regulation, funding,
and peer pressure for the other presidents to do the same. Professor Zhang assumed
leadership of the university through a two-tiered system of a president and Communist
Party Secretary General of the university upon the retirement of President Chen. This
gave Professor Zhang the opportunity to build the new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu
University. The study further focuses on Professor Zhang and his powerful role and
paradoxical style of leadership. On the one hand, he is a strong, tough leader who is
capable of taking full control of the university leadership formally, through his role as the
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary (his official role) and informally, through
the administrative apparatus. On the other hand, he is a team player, is persuasive, and is
a dynamic, entrepreneurial leader who seems to create a great deal of trust in his Party
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and Liaoning Province peers. Combining these two sides together, this paradoxical
leadership led to success in the difficult political environment he faced. His success
seems to have been the result of the support of his powerful network of peers, who went
through the difficulties of the Red Guard and Cultural Revolution, and their sacrifices
together, which has given them a strong bond of trust.
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1
Chapter I: Introduction
Overview of the Study
This is a case study of how Shenyang Jianzhu University in Shenyang, Liaoning
Province, China (see Figure 1.1) has evolved into one of China’s important universities.
A key part of this study will be the leadership role of Professor Fuchang Zhang, Secretary
General of the Communist Party for the university and Communist Party leader of the
university, in the development of the University and in the building of a new campus.
The study focuses on the societal context in which Professor Zhang lived and worked, the
history of Shenyang Jianzhu University, the network of Communist Party officials who
helped Professor Zhang, and the success of Professor Zhang at Shenyang Jianzhu
University from 1998 to 2007.
Figure 1.1. Shenyang Jianzhu University.
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Background of the Study
Because of my travels to China on behalf of Urbana University, Urbana, Ohio, I
became acquainted with the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the work
of the Communist Party leader of the University, Professor Zhang. Due to China’s
growing global economic strength and the major changes occurring in Chinese higher
education, I realized that it would be important to study the development of Shenyang
Jianzhu University, and how it evolved into a contemporary university in today’s China
because of Professor Zhang’s leadership and his network of fellow educational leaders
within the Communist Party in Liaoning Province.
Significance of the Study
This embedded single-case study will explore the development of Shenyang
Jianzhu University from its old campus to a new campus, and the role that Professor
Zhang played in this development. The study will also address how Chinese higher
education developed in the chaos of pre- and post-Mao China. I expect this study will
provide some indication that there has been a major paradigm shift in how Chinese
university leaders manage their institutions, as well as provide some insight into how they
and their institutions may impact the future of China. This case study is about how
Shenyang Jianzhu University developed from 1998 to the present, and the importance
that Communist Party networking played in enabling Professor Zhang to accomplish his
goals.
History of Shenyang Jianzhu University
Shenyang Jianzhu University, established in 1948, is the only comprehensive
university in Liaoning Province focused on civil engineering and architecture, as well as
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a multi-disciplinary education with an emphasis on engineering science, industry,
literature, administration, nature science, agronomy, and law (Wang, 2007). It should be
noted that the city of Shenyang, Liaoning Province, has a population of 7.5 million
people; Liaoning Province has over 42 million people.
Although the university was established in 1948, this study is focused on the
development of the university from 1998 to 2007. It has been during these years, in
concert with the massive developments in Chinese higher education and the burgeoning
Chinese economy, that the university, under the leadership of Professor Zhang, developed
a new campus, merged with other institutions, and became a major Chinese university.
Professor Zhang’s achievement was not only building new university facilities on a new
campus, but also the creation of a university culture to achieve this task. The new
campus, while very contemporary in design, was based on people-oriented concepts and
ideas of the harmonious coexistence between nature and human beings. The concept of
harmonious coexistence was so important to Professor Zhang, that the design kept
sections of the rice patties that originally grew where the university was built (see Figure
1.2). The planting and harvesting of rice from those fields continues to this day, and each
year the university packages the rice and gives small sample bags as gifts to donors and
important visitors as a remembrance of the foundation of the university (Wang, 2007).

4

Figure 1.2. Professor Zhang in field where new campus was built.

Research Question
The research question for the study was: Within the changing social and cultural
context of post-Mao Chinese society, how was Professor Fuchang Zhang able to
significantly increase the size and scope of Shenyang Jianzhu University by building a
new campus?
Methodology for the Study
This study utilizes an embedded single-case study as its mode of inquiry. Data
collection involves a series of 15 in-depth interviews conducted with Professor Zhang,
his peers, other university presidents, and Communist Party government officials in
Liaoning Province. The questions were primarily unstructured in order to allow unique
emergent responses, but also included a few semi-structured questions to give some
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beginning structure to the interviewees because of the English and Mandarin language
issues (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001).
Because the majority of the individuals interviewed do not speak English, a
translator was used during the interviews to allow for translation between English and
Mandarin. All interviews were electronically recorded after receiving proper oral
permissions from the interviewees. An MBA student from Urbana University, whose
name is Jieli Li, did the electronic transcribing and translating of all interviews. In
addition to the electronic recordings, Jieli Li produced a written transcription and
translation of each interview.
Professor Zhang has given permission for use of questionnaires previously
administered through Shenyang Jianzhu University regarding his leadership of the
University. The questionnaires were written and administered by the Communist Party.
Because the Party refused to release the specific questions used in the questionnaires, I
only have the overall results and not the questions themselves.
Limitations of the Study
Some key limitations to the study are relationship-based and others are researchbased. I was presented an opportunity to meet Professor Zhang while I was recruiting
Chinese students for the MBA program at Urbana University, which led to both a
personal friendship and a professional relationship. Because of this relationship and the
perception I had that Professor Zhang was quite successful in developing a new campus
for his university, there is the potential for bias on my part. There is also the possibility
that Professor Zhang’s colleagues, who were very much a part of his network and helped
him to be successful in his efforts at Shenyang Jianzhu University, might be biased in
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how they discussed his work. I have tried to mitigate some of the potential for this bias by
interviewing a diverse number of his colleagues.
Another limitation of the study related to the methodology. Since I do not speak,
read, or write Mandarin, I needed to use translators throughout all of the interviews and
in the transcription process. In order to reduce some of the misunderstanding that could
arise from working in translation, I used a different translator for the interviews and the
transcription, and I took detailed notes during the interviews. Finally, while my sample
consists of 12 interviewees that included Professor Zhang and his peers, government
officials, and other university officials, I chose not to interview faculty members (other
than the administrators) or students. This decision was based on the focus of the study,
which is how a new campus was built for Shenyang Jianzhu University, and the role that
Professor Zhang played.
Organization of the Study
This research is an embedded single-case study of the development of Shenyang
Jianzhu University and the leadership demonstrated by Professor Zhang. Chapter 2 of this
dissertation focuses on three areas of literature. First, I will briefly review the history of
Chinese higher education, with a focus on the last two decades. Second, the chapter
outlines the history of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Third, chapter 2 will briefly discuss
the role of Professor Fuchang Zhang at the university.
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to carry out this case study of Shenyang
Jianzhu University and Professor Zhang’s role as Secretary General of the Communist
Party for the university, which is also the Communist Party leader of the university.
Chapter 4 presents the results of 15 interviews regarding the leadership role of Professor
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Zhang. The results of these interviews have been analyzed by the NVivo computer
program for qualitative analysis.
Chapter 5 discusses the meaning of the interview results presented regarding the
role and work of Professor Zhang in chapter 4 in the context of the literature presented in
chapter 2--the developments of Chinese higher education in the last two decades and
particularly what happened at Shenyang Jianzhu University during this period. The
discussion will deal with the key role that Professor Zhang’s personal network of
educational and Chinese Communist Party leaders, which he developed through his
membership in the Chinese Youth League and the Chinese Communist Party, played in
Shenyang Jianzhu University’s development into a major Chinese university. In chapter
5, I also discuss the implications of the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University (see
Figure 1.3) and Professor Zhang’s style of leadership on the future of Chinese higher
education.
Figure 1.3. Construction progress in 2001.
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Chapter II: Review of the Literature
Introduction
This chapter will present a brief history of Chinese higher education with a strong
focus on the last two decades to help the reader understand the context in which
Shenyang Jianzhu University developed. The major historical themes of this literature
review include the influence of the constantly changing purposes of Chinese higher
education through regime changes; the historical context of the Cultural Revolution, the
Red Guard, and the Chinese Youth League, and the influence on leaders in Chinese
higher education; and briefly, the nature of the governance structure of Chinese
universities which is a dual-structure based on the Communist Party interests and the
operations of the university. Another section of this review will deal with the history of
Shenyang Jianzhu University and the major events in the development of the university,
which is the primary focus of this research, along with the relationship between Professor
Fuchang Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, and how he led the development of the
University.
Chinese higher education is fundamentally influenced by its historical traditions,
as is almost all contemporary Asian higher education. Altbach and Umakoshi (2004)
report that no Asian university is truly Asian in origin, as all are based on European
academic models and traditions imposed by colonial rulers. The fact that Asian
universities began as foreign models played a central role in how these institutions
developed with regard to academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and the relationship
of the university to society (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004).
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History. Founded in 1895, Tianjin University was the earliest modern university
and the Imperial University, later Peking (now Beijing) University, founded in 1898, was
the first university opened to the public in modern times. The founding of these two
universities was the formal beginning of Chinese modern higher education (Hayhoe,
1996).

Beginning in 1911, the history of China has been one of radical social, political,

and economic changes due to the end of the dynasties (Egri & Ralston, 2004).
Prior to 1911, the values in the development of Chinese higher education were
very different than those found in the universities of Europe, where the fundamental
scholarly values can be summed up with the two concepts of autonomy and academic
freedom. The concept of autonomy in European universities was based on communities
of scholars who set their own standards of knowledge and set the standards for the
selection of students, as well as the internal structure and organization of the universities.
Academic freedom in European universities was the precondition for scholars to search
out and advance knowledge in their particular fields without political or governmental
interference (Hayhoe, 1996).
Lixian and Cortazzi (2006) suggest that there was no real parallel between
Chinese traditions in education and the ideals of academic freedom found in Europe. In
effect, the Chinese scholarly institutions were the polar opposite of the academia in
Europe, as neither autonomy nor academic freedom existed.
The revolution of 1911 against the emperor by the warlords established the
Republic of China. The country was essentially ruled by warlords and their armies who
overthrew the emperor until the Northern Expedition of 1927 established the Nationalist
government (Hayhoe, 1996). During this period, from 1911 through 1927, several events
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in education took place. In 1922 and 1924, an American influence was introduced in
education by reform-minded intellectuals (Egri & Ralston, 2004). There was a move
toward social responsibility as seen in American universities, which meant that the
concept of education for the common person was introduced. It was also during this 16year period that the ideals of autonomy and academic freedom began to take root
(Hayhoe, 1996).
Chinese Communist philosophy exerted its influence on higher education for the
first time in the 1920s and 1930s with the creation of Shanghai University (Jin & Jau-wei,
2004). The university was founded on Marxist theoretical ideology in 1921
simultaneously with the formation of the Communist Party--providing explicit links
between the two. The intention of the creation of Shanghai University was to ensure that
its roots would be aligned with China’s Communist revolutionary transformation.
However, the University met its demise in 1928 when it was closed down by Nationalist
government authorities and replaced by the National Labor University whose purpose
was to replace Shanghai University (Hayhoe, 1996).
Higher education changed once again with the founding of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949 (Xin, 1998). Soon after the Chinese Communist Party came into power
in 1949, there was a restructuring of higher education institutions. The Consolidation Era
between 1949 and 1956 sought to establish a new Communist order that placed the
Communist Party above traditional concerns of family and the individual (Yang, R.,
2000).
Under the reign of Mao Zedong (1949 through 1976), higher education was
centralized with the central government having dominion over financing and
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management of higher education. All schools were state run (Mok, 2005). This new
centralization followed a Soviet–inspired version of higher education characterized by
comprehensive universities (Wing-Wan, 1995).
Academic freedom, once again, was not allowed. Instead, the emphasis in higher
education was the new socialist economy and politics. The new Communist state,
however, did have respect for the system that was set up under the Nationalist
government and it entrusted the professors under that system with revising the curriculum
according to Communist Party ideology. The Communist Party plan was to lay down
clear guidelines and provide teaching materials that would gradually shape the socialist
state (Yang, R., 2000).
The number of Chinese higher educational institutions declined under this
restructuring while the number of students increased (Xin, 1998). This newly restructured
national system of higher education emerged as the People’s University System, which
was administered jointly by the Minister of Higher Education and the Central Committee
of the Communist Party (Hayhoe, 1996).
There was continued identification with the Soviet Union educational model due
to the international political climate associated with the Cold War and China’s
participation in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, which resulted in breaking off
relations with the United States (Rai, 1991).
The Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution Decade (1966-1976) began
with factional politics and the struggle between those who supported two different
agendas: the radical faction of Mao, who was in favor of education for the masses of
peasants and workers, and those who supported the Soviet-educational model. The Soviet
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model was in favor of the development of history, economics, politics, culture, and
international affairs within the Communist Party. As part of the Cultural Revolution, Mao
was determined to have his philosophy of higher education dominate. Mao’s new
direction for higher education was to lead to tragedy as anarchy, violence, and chaos
emerged (Hayhoe, 1996).
In the 1960s, Mao began to see trends from those who supported the Soviet model
of higher education that clashed with his ideology and vision of what a revolutionary
society should be, which, along with many other factors, led to the Cultural Revolution.
Mao saw, from the Party faction that did not support him, a culture dominated by
traditional themes rather than revolutionary themes. He saw a Communist Party that had
transformed itself from a servant of the people into a bureaucratic organization full of
corruption, biased social programs that neglected the peasants, and ideological softness.
Mao believed that if the trends that he saw continued, China would return to capitalism
and all the sacrifices and struggles of the past would have come to nothing (Gao, 1987).
Mao is reported to have had two additional motivations for launching the Cultural
Revolution. First, he was concerned about the youth of China. He believed that they
could become worthy successors to the revolution only if they participated in making the
revolution. This perception was critical to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the
schools, and the Red Guards became one of Mao’s main allies in his struggle against the
Party bureaucracy. Second, although the Cultural Revolution was a battle of ideas, it was
also a power struggle. By 1965, Mao felt the Party leaders slighted him because of the
failure of his programs. Therefore, Mao saw the Cultural Revolution as a way to restore
his dominance in Chinese politics (Gao, 1987).
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Following the death of Mao, the Cultural Revolution was officially defined as
wrongly started by Mao, taken advantage of by a handful of plotters, and a disaster to the
Party’s cause and the Chinese people’s lives (Lin, 1991). As described by Lin (1991), the
Cultural Revolution mobilized and engaged the masses to fight among each other with
the consequence that large numbers of people were humiliated to the point of suicide or
were tortured to death, and countless people were permanently wounded, both physically
and psychologically.
The Red Guard. The Cultural Revolution, as discussed in the previous section,
indicates the movement from Mao’s perspective and his reasons for its beginning.
Another important perspective on the Cultural Revolution and its consequences on the
masses of China was the development of the student movement known as the Red Guard.
The Red Guard Movement began with Mao’s support. On August 18, 1966, Mao publicly
reviewed one million Red Guards in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. From then on, the Red
Guard Movement gained legitimacy, power, and prestige. While the Chinese Communist
Party has always relied on the youth as part of the Revolution, the Red Guard was the
first major youth movement after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution
(Fairbank, 1989).
The Red Guards totally trusted the Party and Mao and, therefore, did not feel that
they could make mistakes. The Red Guards repeatedly quoted Mao’s words to justify
their acts, “the thousand components of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence:
Rebellion is justified. Based on this understanding, one should struggle, resist, and make
socialist revolution” (Lin, 1991, p. 26).
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Literally, Red Guard means students who were from red categories and who were
regarded as the guards of Chairman Mao Zedong and the socialist cause. The Red
categories included the proletarian class, workers, peasants, revolutionary soldiers, and
revolutionary martyrs. The class enemies were referred to as Black categories: landlords,
rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitors, and spies. Students who were
considered enemies of the state because of their elite backgrounds were denied admission
to the Red Guards (Lin, 1991).
The Red Guard movement after 1967 became involved in the politics of the
country. It divided into different factions, differing in political opinions and support, each
faction claiming that it was the most loyal to Chairman Mao. Antagonism among the
factions reached its climax when they fought among themselves and resulted in hundreds
of thousands of casualties. The fighting continued among the Red Guards until mid-1968,
when Mao decided to send the army and workers’ organizations into schools to restore
order (Yixin, 1999). The end to the Red Guard movement came officially in 1968, when
Mao sent a group of workers to Qinghua University, the birthplace of the Red Guard
movement, to suppress the movement and bring it officially to an end due to the extreme
violence and number of deaths (Yang, G., 2000). After that time, the Red Guards were
not major actors in the Cultural Revolution. The last eight years of the Cultural
Revolution (1969 through 1976) saw less large-scale violence (Yixin, 1999).
Although the Red Guards were devout, even fanatic, followers of Chairman Mao,
no generation in the People’s Republic suffered more misfortunes than the Red Guard
generation. The Red Guards consisted of about 27 million Chinese who were born
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between 1947 and 1959 (Yixin, 1999). In effect, the Red Guard, as a major force, lasted
only about two years--from mid-1966 to 1968 (Yixin, 1999).
The Communist Youth League. Luo (2004) writes that university students in China
have always enjoyed a unique status. University students have led many political
movements, causing political and social changes in China. Before the 1940s, and during
the 1950s and 1960s, student activism was part of the radicalism that led to the victories
of the Communist Party. During the late 1960s and 1970s, revolutionary youth played
roles in the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard. The reform decade of the 1980s
witnessed a reemergence of youth, with different ideologies than the radical Red Guard,
culminating in the Tiananmen Square movement of 1989. Throughout these times, the
youth of China have always played an important role in the ideology of their country.
The chronology of the Chinese youth movement dates back over 90 years to 1911,
or the end of dynasty rule and the introduction of parliamentary rule. The first youth
movement was based on the Chinese bourgeois revolution, which marked the end of
dynasty rule between 1911 and 1913. Later, in 1919, there was a second youth movement
led by the proletariat youth. The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 gave
rise to yet another youth movement based on socialism. The Chinese Communist Party
used the evolution of the youth movements for developing the revolutionary ideals for the
youth of China. About 1949, the youth movement, which coincides with the Communist
movement in higher education, was named the Communist Youth League, which is still
the name of the group today (Wang, 1993).
The Communist Youth League was one of the most important organizations in the
People’s Republic of China from 1949 until 1967, prior to the beginning of the Cultural
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Revolution. It was the link between the Communist Party and the youth of China. The
Youth League recruited potential student leaders who could be expected to graduate to
Party membership and leadership. Accordingly, the success or failure of the Youth
League was linked to the stability of the Chinese Revolution itself (Leader, 1974).
During the era between 1949 and 1952, the Youth League was asked to mobilize
the youth to carry out the Party’s programs of economic, political, and military training
(Joshi, 1980). The Chinese Communist Youth Movement between 1956 and 1962 saw
the rapid expansion of the Youth League with greatly increased demand on its
membership. The change in the League’s position that this growth entailed, and its
increased responsibilities amongst the population, were recognized by its change of name
to the Communist Youth League (Funnell, 1970).
The downfall of the Chinese Communist Youth League began in 1967 at the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution when the Revolutionary Rebel Corps seized power
from the Central Committee. From 1967 until 1971, the Chinese Communist Youth
League was inoperative. The leaders of the Youth League acquired the status of an
enemy of Mao (Leader, 1974).
In 1978, it was decided that, with the demise of Mao who died in 1976, the Youth
League would emphasize economic development as opposed to the Party emphasis of
socialism. In order to attain the new goals of economic development, the Chinese
Communist Youth League’s leadership fell under the control of the Party’s leadership to
establish the Youth League as a regular working arm of the Party (Joshi, 1980).
Students began to look at the Youth League differently. The students gradually
changed their perceptions and realized that joining the Youth League and eventually the
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Chinese Communist Party was a way to career successes and individual interests
(Dingxin, 1997).
Post cultural revolution. Through the Cultural Revolution, Mao gave a clear
warning to the intellectuals in higher education that they had gone too far in their
criticisms. This effectively silenced the voices of the scholars. Just before the beginning
of the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished--placing
institutions under provincial control. This move strengthened Party control over
educational institutions. The preferred model for most provinces was to establish new
provincial comprehensive universities. The Cultural Revolution affected a drop in
enrollment in higher education (Hayhoe, 1996).
Clearly the expectation was that a new and revolutionary knowledge system could
be fostered, with the disciplines and specializations of the Western and Soviet
University suspended for once and for all. . . . The struggle was to lead to tragedy.
No viable educational alternative emerged, only anarchy, violence, and chaos.
(Hayhoe, 1996, p. 103)
Following Mao’s death in 1976 and the end of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping,
the new leader of China and one of the old guard of the Chinese Communist Party,
ushered in the Social Reform Era in 1978 by encouraging individualism and economic
efficiency (Egri & Ralston, 2004). The crucial task for higher education under his
leadership was to restore some structure to higher education after the destructive years of
Mao’s Cultural Revolution. The first period of this restoration, from 1978 through the
mid-1980s, saw a great deal of expansion. The second period, 1985 until 1992, was
devoted to education reform (Xin, 2001).
The reform period began with a change in goals for educational development
from the abandonment of the Cultural Revolution’s goal of class struggle to the adoption
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of modernization. This enabled many people who were not able to attend higher
education because of the Cultural Revolution to catch up (Hayhoe, 1996).
Beginning in the 1980s, a pattern of contemporary reforms in Chinese higher
education occurred within a new international and economic framework that saw the
decline of communism. Higher education in China adapted three major characteristics:
decentralization, diversification of curriculum, and removal of political forces from
campuses including the abolition of political and ideological ideas from the curriculum.
The state’s guidance was focused on economic ideas and economic development (WingWan, 1995).
Political control in the Chinese universities had depended heavily on the
cooperation of the students. Now, participating in Communist ideology was no longer
necessary for students. As a result, political control over students began to decline, which
made a significant contribution to the rise of the 1989 Chinese Student Movement
(Dingxin, 1997).
The Chinese students rebelled at Tiananmen Square in 1989 to fight against
corruption, bureaucracy, and political control. They demanded a democratic system with
greater participation in the rule of law, freedom of the press, and political reform. The
movement and the students were suppressed by the Communist Party (Dingxin, 1997).
The 1989 movement was a setback for both Chinese youth and the Communist
Party. It was a setback for the youth because the government’s reaction to their
movement was the opposite of their hopes and expectations; it was a setback for the
Chinese Communist Party because it showed that the official communist ideology had
lost its influence on the youth. Since the 1989 movement, the Communist Party has
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maintained tighter control and the youth have avoided involvement in politics. In
addition, following the 1989 movement, students were generally not interested in
applying for membership to or attending activities of the Communist Youth League
(Dingxin, 1997).
Further, as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, many changes took
place in the internal management of university curricula. After the Tiananmen Square
event of 1989, many of the diverse interactions with international universities that had
become vital to the process of higher education in China came under threat. The
government suspended many foreign programs which it felt would foster unwelcome
influences from Western countries. In 1993, however, the Party implemented the reform
document that gave much of this freedom back to the universities. For the first time, there
seemed to be a possibility that political study could enter into a relationship of dialogue
and mutual transformation with other fields of knowledge (Hayhoe, 1996).
Present. Chinese universities, although shaped by their historical traditions, have
had to face the complex realities of the 21st century. The population of China has a low
level of education and a low-quality, or uneducated, workforce, with university students
occupying a special position in the labor market (Fang, 2005). The economic miracle
taking place in China has not been based on higher education. The typical pattern of
industrialization was based on an inexpensive labor force (Fang, 2005).
However, much like other developing nations, China’s continued dependence on
an uneducated workforce will not allow its economy to continue to flourish. Moreover,
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to cross-cultural
interaction. Students and faculty exchange research programs and academic
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communication issues are adding to an irreversible internationalizing trend in Chinese
higher education reform. The challenges are considerable to bring higher education to the
masses: the two most important are funding the expansion and providing physical
facilities (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). This is the basis of this case study about the
major events in the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University.
Restructuring higher education has required the Chinese government to eliminate
excessive government controls by granting universities more autonomy over curriculum
and resources. The government believes that by extending greater autonomy, the
universities will become more innovative and responsive to the 21st century needs of
higher education (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). However, along with reform and greater
autonomy, arises new accountability. The leaders in higher education usually have an
annual performance appraisal, which the government uses to decide funding and status of
the university leaders (Vidovich, Yang, & Currie, 2007). Professor Zhang’s leadership
qualities are measured annually in a sample questionnaire that is presented as archival
data for this study.
Although the state has increased appropriations for higher education, there are
still serious financial constraints on the universities. One of the changes permitted
through increased autonomy is to allow Chinese universities to use their professors and
staff specializing in science and technology to generate revenue for the university by
forming companies affiliated with the university (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004).
Policies about curriculum and instruction in higher education have evolved during
the last two decades, as China has made the transition from a planned economy to a
socialist market economy. Interdisciplinary studies in the humanities and social sciences
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have been encouraged which has led to a shift away from the old learning processes of
memorization to new emphases on critical thinking (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004).
While the establishment of the market economy requires that education adapt to
the economic changes, at the same time Chinese leaders still maintain that a socialist
market economy should follow Marx’s thesis that social existence is determined by
society’s conditions of production. This is viewed by some as incompatible with a
successful market economy (Guorui, 2006).
The market economy has increasingly become a fact that cannot be ignored in
China’s economic life. People have opened their minds to these facts and for the
first time since the founding of the People’s Republic have listed education and
the socialist market economy as important. (Guorui, 2006, p. 36)
The goal of Chinese higher education in the 21st century is to achieve world-class
status and be part of the international academic community. In order to accomplish this,
faculty reform is paramount. Traditionally, since China did not have a postgraduate
degree system until the 1980s, only 30% of the faculty holds postgraduate degrees.
Therefore, more faculty members are being sent abroad to study and are becoming
internationally trained scholars (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). Previously there were few
measures in place to encourage faculty to continue their education due to the ideological
and political concern about faculty. This lack of encouragement slowed the development
of faculty in higher education. The Party has now set strategic targets for faculty which
include higher ethical standards, quality checks, salary increases, more promotions,
increased funding, and more sabbaticals (Wei, 2005).
Chinese universities have undergone rapid expansion. Enrollment increased from
2.2 million in 1992, to about 9 million by 2002. This is because of public investment in
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and access to higher education in China for lower income families (Altbach & Umakoshi,
2004).
The History of Shenyang Jianzhu University
Shenyang Jianzhu University was established in 1948. It is the only
comprehensive university in Liaoning Province that specializes in civil engineering and
architecture; however, it has academic programs in engineering, science, literature,
administration, agriculture, and law. There is a long-standing history of transformation
that is a result of institutions that have joined together to become Shenyang Jianzhu
University (Mei, 1997).
Mei (1997) provides background on Shenyang Jianzhu University and identifies
its roots in Liaoning Construction Industry College from 1948. Following the Industry
College was the founding of Shenyang Technical Specialist College, which was changed
into Shenyang Industrial Technical College in 1952 to meet the educational and
economic needs of the area. A subsequent evolution in 1953 saw another name change to
Shenyang Industrial College which operated in conjunction with the North Military
Industrial College. This structure lasted until 1958. The evolution of the university
continued with a subsequent name change to Liaoning Construction Engineering College
in 1964, and once again experienced another name change to Province Scale College in
1974 (Mei, 1997).
Deng Xiaoping, who became the nation’s leader on January 1, 1975, was a
proponent of education innovation, believing that science, physics, and foreign language
knowledge was necessary (Mei & Zhang, 1987). In order to align with the new
government mission, a new college building team at the University was formally
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established in 1976. Liaoning Construction Engineering College was reorganized with an
emphasis on innovation with ten new majors in foreign language, education, and the
sciences as well as the study of Marxism and Leninism (Mei & Zhang, 1987).
Graduate programs were started during this period. In addition, there was a focus
on educational reforms in the sciences and student political work. These developments
coincided with the formation of the First College Party Union and First Instructor
Representative group, which was formed to meet with instructors to help begin graduate
programs (Mei, 1997).
In order to stabilize college leadership and strengthen the new educational
guidelines, the Second College Party Union, along with the Second Instructor
Representative’s meeting, was held. These two groups established new guidelines
designed to strengthen programs in the sciences, languages, and politics, as well as
education and research curricula (Mei, 1997).
The Third and Fourth College Party Union, and Instructor Representatives groups
met and began plans for the next century to further Deng Xiaoping’s goals for education.
As part of the new goals, planning began for major construction of a new campus that
would use concepts and ideas of harmonious coexistence between nature and human
beings (Mei, 1997).
In the year 2000, which marked the next five-year plan, Liaoning Construction
Engineering College became a university and the name was changed again to Shenyang
Architectural and Civil Engineering Institute. In 2003, with the first entering class for the
new campus, the name was changed to Shenyang Jianzhu University. As a result of the
year 2000 five-year plan, Shenyang Jianzhu University, as it was now known, along with

24
200 other universities and colleges, were transferred from the Central Ministries and
Committees to the authority of the provincial government in Liaoning Province, thereby
stressing local management while developing cooperation between the central
government and the local government (Wang, 2007).
The new policies of the provincial government allowed Shenyang Jianzhu
University to build the new campus in the Hunan section of the city of Shenyang. One of
the new policies permitted the University to raise, by itself, 800 million Chinese Yuan
(64 million US Dollars) by selling the land where the old campus was located to allow
the financing of the land for the new campus (Wang, 2007).
The building of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus occurred in less than
two years. The size of the university grew from 133,400 square meters to the current
980,490 square meters. The student population increased from 4,000 to almost 13,000
undergraduate and graduate students (Wang, 2007).
Professor Zhang assumed the leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University in 1998.
The building of the new campus was the result of his leadership in financing and
government action.
Today, the new campus is located in the college town of the Hunan New District
in Shenyang, a city of 7.5 million people in Northeastern China (Liaoning Province),
North of North Korea, and has a total campus area of about one million square meters
and a total building area of over one-half million square meters. An external, three-level
corridor, which is about one-half mile long connects the teaching, lab, living, and
administrative areas together. The architectural design of this corridor is unique to the
University and is the longest of its kind in Asia (Wang, 2007) (see Figure 2.1).
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Shenyang Jianzhu University has 15 colleges and 1,560 faculty members. Current
enrollment consists of nearly 16,000 degree candidates, including 11,634 undergraduates,
780 graduates, as well as doctoral students, foreign students, and students enrolled in
adult and professional schools. The University has master’s degrees in 18 programs and
one doctoral degree. Undergraduate education consists of 33 subjects (Wang, 2007).
Shenyang Jianzhu University has sister relationships with more than 40
universities in 30 countries. In this way, Shenyang Jianzhu University has strengthened
its connection with foreign universities worldwide (Wang, 2007).
Figure 2.1. Construction in 2002 with external corridor.

Professor Fuchang Zhan
Professor Fuchang Zhang was a part of the Cultural Revolution, a member of the
Red Guard, a member of the Communist Youth League, and a member of the ruling
Chinese Communist Party in Liaoning Province. He became one of the Party elite while
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living through this turbulent history. Professor Zhang is a Secretary General of the
Communist Party Committee (the Chinese Communist Party Leader) of Shenyang
Jianzhu University in Liaoning Province.
The distinguishing characteristic of Chinese Communist leadership is that the
leadership is composed of the Party elite (Burns, 1979). Because the Communist Party
elite are the leaders in China, one could argue that the great man theory of leadership
from the 1930s, or the trait and behavior leadership theorists through the 1950s and 1960s
would apply to the Communist elite because of their authoritarian revolutionary style of
leadership (Rost, 1993). While professor Zhang is a member of the Party elite and could
be seen as part of this leader-focused conception, he does display a strong interest in a
much more networked leadership style through his elaborate network of peers,
government leaders, and other university leaders. Yukl (2002) writes that networks are
identified in a number of ways. But, the important factors are showing respect, offering
unconditional favors, passing on useful information, and showing appreciation for favors
received. Old relationships need to be maintained while developing new ones. Bass
(1990) writes that the typical network is composed of subordinates, peers, superiors, and
outsiders, which reflects the composition of Professor Zhang’s networks. Networks are
important because quite often, especially in the complex realities of 21st century
organizations, the performance and effectiveness of the leader and domain of influence
depends on the size and scope of the network (Bass, 1990). Professor Zhang is very much
involved with such a network, which is consistent with what Bass (1990) refers to as
open, or two-way communication between superior, subordinates, and peers.
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Chinese university governance. As a result of the Communist Party’s
politicization of the higher education system in 1985, the State Education Commission
directed that the state would control the appointments of chief university executives, the
development of the curriculum, and the nature of student activities. Therefore, there was
an integration of university administration and politics. Within the Chinese higher
education system, there are two governance structures: the university administration team
led by a president and a Communist Party Secretary General of the University, who, at
Shenyang Jianzhu University, is Professor Zhang (Wing-Wan, 1995).
Under this system, university presidents were given limited powers over the
institution, which were mostly administrative powers. The Party Secretary General was
given the duties to guarantee and supervise the implementation of the Party’s principles,
policies and the state’s educational plans. The 1993 education reform guidelines
explicitly direct that the Party leader has the highest decision-making role in each higher
education institution (Wing-Wan, 1995).
University financing. Because this case study is focused on how Shenyang
Jianzhu University evolved from 1998 to the present, financing of the new campus and
the role that Professor Zhang played in the financing is of importance. After 1949, when
the Communist Party assumed control of China, private financing in Chinese higher
education was perceived to be associated with capitalism. All private colleges, especially
those run by churches, were nationalized in the 1950s--ownership was transferred to the
state. The Chinese Communist Party saw this nationalization as a way to prevent foreign
influences on Chinese higher education. As a result, Chinese higher education was
completely financed by the central government (Wing-Wan, 1995).
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A new era of financing Chinese higher education emerged during the 1970s that
changed the policies of the 1940s through the 1950s. Financing of higher education in
China was influenced by three distinct periods starting in the 1970s.
The first period from 1978 to the beginning of the 1980s, is the period of restoring
the higher education system. The second period from 1985 until 1992 reflects the
first wave of higher education reform. The third period from 1992 to [2001],
reflects government efforts to deepen the reform of the structuring and financing
of higher education. (Xin, 2001, p. 206)
Xin (2001) continues
China’s higher education administrative and finance reform has attempted to
decentralize the financial responsibility to lower levels of government and
restructure the administrative system. The finance reforms have diversified the
funding scheme of higher education and created more channels for public
financing of higher education. (p. 216)
As will become evident, Professor Zhang’s ability to raise large amounts of
money from many sources represents a key part of his success. His ability to develop
these financial resources is no doubt related to his personal skills but is also the result of
his network of associates that was developed as a result of his experiences in the Cultural
Revolution, the Red Guard, the Communist Youth League, and the Chinese Communist
Party.
In China, the political leaders are identified by numbering generations. The
Fourth Generation is the group of leaders in their 50s and early 60s. The Fourth
Generation leaders, who are Professor Zhang’s peer group, follow two models of
nationalism. The official Party ideology is still that of the historical patriotic struggle
linked to the Chinese Communist Party. The Party is the center of nationalism. The
second model is called popular nationalism, can be more critical of the Party, and is
centered on economic development and decisive action in defense of China’s interests.
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While Fourth Generation leaders are somewhat constrained due to popular nationalism,
they are also free to make choices that could not be made in the past (Seckington, 2005).
Conclusion
This case study will contribute to the body of knowledge of Chinese higher
education by studying the building of a Chinese university (see Figure 2.2 for the first
entering class of the university), and then exploring the role of its leader in the building
process. It is hoped that the integration of these elements will provide for a better
understanding of Chinese higher education institutions, especially Shenyang Jianzhu
University.
There are many questions that can be asked about Professor Zhang that address
his role in Chinese higher education reform and the development of Shenyang Jianzhu
University. Given that Professor Zhang is credited with building the new campus, what
was his exact role at the University at the time? How did he get the power to make all
these changes? What was his relationship to other stakeholders at the University? How do
those stakeholders perceive Professor Zhang’s roles and success? How did he get the
resources to achieve these changes? Who comprised his networks? How was Professor
Zhang perceived by key educational leaders in Liaoning Province? How did his
membership in the Communist Youth League and the Communist Party help him to
achieve his accomplishments at Shenyang Jianzhu University?
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Figure 2.2. First entering class, 2003.
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Chapter III: Methodology
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to describe the development of Shenyang Jianzhu
University, which was established in 1948 in Liaoning Province as the only
comprehensive university that specializes in civil engineering and architecture, as well as
multidisciplinary education among engineering science, industry, literature,
administration, nature science, agronomy, and law. The study focuses on the role played
by the Chinese Communist Party Leader of the University, and Secretary General of the
Communist Party, Professor Fuchang Zhang, in significantly expanding the physical and
enrollment capacity of Shenyang Jianzhu University.
Methodology
The methodology for this study will be a single-case study to explore the
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Yin (2003) writes of four types of case
study designs. There are holistic and embedded single-case designs, as well as holistic
and embedded multiple-case designs. The holistic design concerns a case study that
examines the global nature of an organization or program. In contrast is the embedded
case study, which is the methodology I have chosen. The embedded case study design is
the study of a single case, the construction of a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu
University, but attention is also given to a subunit of study, which is the role Professor
Fuchang Zhang, Communist Party leader of the university, played in the development of
the university. Embedded studies sometimes also use some quantitative analysis, which,
to a limited extent, will be the case in this study. Professor Zhang has authorized my use
of a quantitative questionnaire administered by the Communist Party in four separate
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years that studied his performance as the leader of Shenyang Jianzhu University and
Secretary General of the Communist Party at the University as his position relates to his
leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University (J. Yu, personal communication, April 6,
2007).
“One of the strengths of qualitative methods is the inductive, naturalistic inquiry
strategy of approaching a setting without a predetermined hypothesis” (Patton, 2002, p.
129). Qualitative research was selected as the research method for this study because it is
the best method to inquire not just about the history of Shenyang Jianzhu University, but
also how the institution developed from its inception under the Chinese Communist Party
rules into a well-known, modern educational institution in today’s environment.
Quantitative data would not begin to bring to life the true story.
A major part of this study is how Professor Zhang was instrumental in the
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the evolution of his personal life from
being a part of the Cultural Revolution, a member of the Chinese Communist Youth
League and the Red Guard, to becoming a Secretary General of the Communist Party of
the University. A qualitative study such as this is the best approach to explore Professor
Zhang’s role in the building of a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University.
Rationale
There are five primary reasons that a single-case study is an appropriate design.
The first rationale is the critical case, which tests a well-formulated theory. The second
rationale is a unique case, mostly used in clinical psychology. The third rationale is the
representative case, in which the case study may represent a project that is informative to
an institution. The fourth rationale is a revelatory case, or the observance of a
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phenomenon previously inaccessible. The fifth rationale for a single-case study is a
longitudinal case study, or the same single case at two or more points in time (Yin,
2003).
The rationale for my single case study is the fourth rationale or the revelatory
case, whose objective is to observe a phenomenon previously inaccessible such as this
study that explores the construction of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the role of
Professor Zhang in this undertaking. The lessons learned in revelatory studies are
distinguished as rare or unique, which is apparent in this study because Professor Zhang,
as a Secretary General of the Communist Party at Shenyang Jianzhu University has never
given access to his story for an empirical study (Yin, 2003). The Letter of Approval that
is part of my approved IRB application for this research goes directly to the revelatory
rationale in that my research is seen as informative to Shenyang Jianzhu University. The
letter of approval states “We firmly believe that his [William D. Blizzard, Jr.’s] research
will contribute to the sustainable development of the University and we will try our best
to cooperate with Professor William in his further study” (J. Yu, personal
communication, April 6, 2007). Further evidence that the rationale for this case study is
revelatory or unique is that when I first proposed this research to Professor Zhang and he
agreed, he also told me that he had been asked by other researchers, as well as the
Chinese press, if they could write about his successes and leadership methods but he had
declined.
Data Sources
Data collection involved a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Professor
Zhang. Two interviews, one in 2004 and the second in 2007, took place in Urbana, Ohio
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and Indianapolis, Indiana respectively, while professor Zhang was visiting in the United
States. Subsequent interviews have taken place in China during visits for the purpose of
completing the research. The initial interview with Professor Zhang was in 2004, and it
was that interview that convinced me that this case study would be possible. The 2004
interview established a relationship of trust between Professor Zhang and me that allowed
Professor Zhang to give his permission to proceed with the case study about him and
Shenyang Jianzhu University.
A second group of interviews was conducted with Professor Zhang’s colleagues
at the university in 2007. I was given the opportunity to choose anyone that I would like
to interview and Professor Zhang made the proper arrangements. Additionally, interviews
with the stakeholders who have interacted with Professor Zhang within the Communist
Party, with Liaoning Provincial government, and other university officials who know
Professor Zhang were arranged for my research by the University or by Professor Zhang
(see Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 for charts of interviews that were conducted). The purpose
of these interviews was to determine how Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus
was built and the nature of Professor Zhang’s role in this development. The interviews
from Professor Zhang, his peers, other university officials, and Communist Party
government officials along with the archival data will be part of the triangulation of the
study’s conclusions.
Interviews. Patton (2002) writes “the purpose of interviewing. . . is to allow us to
enter into the other person’s perspective. We interview to find out what is in and on
someone else’s mind, and to gather stories” (p. 341). I used the informal conversational
interview called the unstructured interview for maximum flexibility to pursue information
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in whatever direction became appropriate. Data gathered was not only different from
each person interviewed, but from the same person on different occasions. This does not
mean that the conversational interviews were unfocused; they required an overall
purpose, which was kept in mind (Patton, 2002). That focus was the development of
Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus and Professor Zhang’s leadership in this
endeavor.
Although I intended to use unstructured interviews, the interviews were
conducted somewhat formally in the beginning to establish my credentials as a professor
from Urbana University and a student conducting research for my Ph.D. from Antioch
University. Also, I demonstrated that I had permission from my university as well as
from Shenyang Jianzhu University by giving each candidate a copy of my letter of
approval and establishing orally that I had Professor Zhang’s, as well as the Communist
Party’s, permission to both record and conduct the interview.
The major questions related first to establishing the relationship between the
interviewee and Professor Zhang. Next, I asked questions along the theme of the
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and how the development relates to other
university campuses in Liaoning Province, China. The next general theme of questions
relates Professor Zhang’s leadership to the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University.
After establishing the main theme of the development of the University and Professor
Zhang’s leadership abilities, I asked questions about Professor Zhang’s involvement in
the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Youth League and the Red Guard,
which was reportedly an important part of the experience of the current leaders in higher
education in China. Follow up questions included issues that emerged from initial
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interviews. The interviews lasted a minimum of two or more hours and some lasted at
least four hours.
The translator for the interviews was Wang Xing (Kevin) who is in the
Department of International Exchange and Cooperation, Shenyang Jianzhu University.
He was assigned by the university to accompany me throughout my multiple visits to
China while conducting my research. Kevin had been briefed on the nature of my
research, the methodology, and interview techniques involved, as well as the
confidentiality required for research. I had not given Kevin any questions in advance
because the design of the study employs open-ended questions. All interviews were
recorded with a digital recorder capable of downloading the recorded sessions to a
computer hard drive for translation and transcription. Translation took place
simultaneously during the interviews as my questions were translated from English into
Mandarin and the Mandarin answers were translated back into English. The recording
captured the Mandarin and English of each interview.
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Figure 3.1. Organizational chart of interviewees.
METHODOLOGY: INTERVIEWS
Organizational Chart of the Interviewees:
Shenyang Jianzhu University

Administration

Communist Party
Professor Chen,
past President
(Dean, School of Architecture)

Shi Tie Mao,
Assistant President
July 3, 2007

Professor Yu Jin,
Director,
Department of Intern ’l
Exchange & Cooperation
June 29, 2007

(July 2, 2007)

Professor Fuchang Zhang,
Secretary General
SJZU Communist Party
2004,2007

Professor Gu Nanning
Director
Human Resources
Department
June 29, 2007

Figure 3.2. Position chart of interviewees, Liaoning Province Officials.
METHODOLOGY: INTERVIEWS
Positions of Interviewees:
Liaoning Province Officials

Government Officials

Luo Shao Mei
Director
Education Department
July 1, 2007

Pinli , Zhang
Director
Development Planning
Education Department
July 2, 2007

Communist Party Officials

Gong Xi
Secretary
Education and Science
Working Committee
July 3, 2007
Zhao Rigang
Deputy Secretary
Education and Science
Working Committee
July 3, 2007
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Figure 3.3. Position chart of interviewees, University Administrators.
METHODOLOGY: INTERVIEWS

Positions of Interviewees:
University Administrators
Wang Qiang , President
Shenyang Polytechnic College
July 3, 2007

Ding Liyi, Vice President
Liaoning Technical Institute of
Economic Mgt
July 4, 2007

Sun. Ying, Dean
Shenyang Polytechnic College
July 1, 2007

Archival data. Professor Zhang gave permission for the review and inclusion of
previously administered Shenyang Jianzhu University questionnaires. These
questionnaires relate directly to Professor Zhang’s leadership of the university and will be
provided as archival evidence for the case study. The surveys are sets of questionnaires
from 2002 through 2005 of Professor Zhang’s performance as a leader (J. Yu, personal
communication, April 6, 2007). Shenyang Jianzhu University provided only the results of
the survey. I specifically requested the questions. The university passed my request on to
the Communist Party, but the Party refused to share them. These data have been provided
by Shenyang Jianzhu University from their archives (J. Yu, personal communication,
April 6, 2007). Admittedly the data is sparse and consists of only one question with a
Likert scale response from 1 to 4 respectively. Therefore, the results of this single
question will only be used as a descriptive item of interest regarding Zhang’s leadership.
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Participants
There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on
what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be
useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and
resources. (Patton, 2002, p. 244)
The sampling strategy that I used is opportunistic or emergent sampling, which
involves decision making to take advantage of new opportunities during actual data
collection (Patton, 2002). It has been my experience while working in China that one will
have opportunities presented without planning or notice. I have been in many meetings
when people, mostly of high ranking authority unexpectedly were in attendance without
prior indication that they would be there. They can, and often do, change the demeanor of
a meeting.
Although I took advantage of opportunistic or emergent sampling, as one person
or organization referred me to another, or as I encountered someone who has special
knowledge about Professor Zhang’s work, I did have a list of specific people that I
wanted to interview. In all, including Professor Zhang, I interviewed 12 people.
Foremost, of course, was Professor Zhang. Although I previously had the opportunity for
two interviews with him--one in May, 2004 at Urbana, Ohio and the second in January,
2007 at Indianapolis, Indiana--I was able to conduct two additional interviews in June
and July of 2007 in Shenyang. I was able to interview Professor Yu Jin, Director of the
Department of International Exchange and Cooperation, Shenyang Jianzhu University,
which was important because he is closely aligned with professor Zhang and is the
Communist Party representative in charge of my research from the perspective of
Shenyang Jianzhu University. Another important interview was with Shi Tie Mao,
Assistant President of Shenyang Jianzhu University, who is essentially second in charge
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of the university administration. I was able to interview Professor Gu Nanning who is the
Director of the Human Resources Department, Shenyang Jianzhu University. The most
important interview, other than Professor Zhang, was with Professor Chen, who was the
past President of Shenyang Jianzhu University and was president when the decision was
made to move to a new campus.
I asked Professor Zhang to arrange interviews with other university administrators
prior to completing interviews with his colleagues because I wanted other university
administrators to be part of the sample. He arranged for me to interview Wang Qiang,
President of Shenyang Polytechnic College who has worked for many years with
Professor Zhang. I was also able to interview Sun Ying, who is the Dean of Shenyang
Polytechnic College. Another university president that I interviewed was Ding Liyi,
President of Liaoning Technical Institute of Economic Vocation.
There were several government officials that I interviewed about professor Zhang
and Shenyang Jianzhu University. One of the more critical interviews was with Gong
Xia, Secretary of the Education and Science Working Committee; he is the Party
representative in charge of all Liaoning Provence University Party leaders and is
Professor Zhang’s boss. The rapport established in this interview was evidenced by
Secretary Gong’s invitation for me to have dinner with Professor Zhang, Secretary Gong,
and their wives that evening. I was told he had not extended himself this way in over 20
years in his position. I was also able to interview Mr. Gong’s second in charge, Zhao
Rigang, Deputy Secretary of the Education and Science Working Committee.
Mrs. Luo Shaomei, Director of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province,
Shenyang P.R. China, has extensive knowledge of Professor Zhang and the history of
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Shenyang Jianzhu University. I was very pleased to have Mrs. Luo agree to an interview
not only because of her personal friendship and business relationship with Professor
Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, but also because she is the person who is in
charge of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province. Mrs. Luo is the person who
approved and licensed Urbana University to recruit in China. Pinli Zhang from
Development Planning of the Education Department of Liaoning Province, was the last
government official interviewed. He knew Professor Zhang from a planning and approval
process for Shenyang Jianzhu University’s growth.
Data Analysis
Raw field notes and verbatim transcripts constitute the undigested complexity of
reality. Simplifying and making sense out of the complexity constitutes the
challenge of content analysis. Developing some manageable classification or
coding scheme is the first step of analysis, [which] . . .essentially means analyzing
the core content of interviews and observations to determine what’s significant.
(Patton, 2002, p. 463)
One begins with shorthand codes written directly in the margins directly on the
relevant data passages. Many passages will illustrate more than one theme or pattern and
the first reading through the data is to develop coding of the categories or classifications
(Patton, 2002).
For case studies, notes are likely to be the most common component of a
database. The notes may be a result of interviews or observations and may take several
forms, such as a diary, as long as the system is usable by an outside party (Yin, 2003). I
took field notes and recorded my interviews. Each interview was translated and
transcribed electronically, as well as in writing. After an initial coding in the margins of
the transcription, I entered the data electronically and used the computer program NVivo
to analyze my data.
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Strauss and Corbin (1998) write that meanings get lost in translation and that
coding may become difficult in that sometimes there is no equivalent word capable of
capturing the subtle nuances in the meaning of the original language. Therefore, they
recommend that key passages should be paid attention to approximating the original as
closely as possible. I used an MBA student from Urbana University, whose name is Jieli
Li, to transcribe and translate the interviews from my recording. Jieli Li is very mature
and is well respected within the university; she has been a graduate assistant to the MBA
program and has proven herself to be an excellent student and someone who can be
trusted. She has her bachelor’s degree from Shenyang Communication University and has
an extensive business background in management in China. Jieli Li was a member of the
Youth League at her university, which is the group from which future leaders are chosen
in China. I instructed her to transcribe and ensure translation as accurately as possible
because of the difficulty in conducting research in a language that I do not speak or
understand.
While translating and transcribing interviews is always more difficult and
complex than working in a language that one speaks and reads, there is an opportunity for
triangulation when multiple perspectives are used--for example, my having the
perspective and simultaneous translation of Kevin Wang (during the interviews) and
especially the translator Jieli Li during the transcription, as well and my own perspective
and reflections during the interviews and making notes as I did. I used the services of
Jieli Li to assist with the coding of this case study.
Patton (1987) writes that
Denzin (1978) identified four basic types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation-the use of a variety of data sources in a study, for example, interviewing people in
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different status positions or with different points of view; (2) investigator
triangulation--the use of several different evaluators or social scientists; (3) theory
triangulation--the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data; and
(4) methodological triangulation--the use of multiple methods to study a single
problem or program, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and
documents. (p. 60)
This study used data triangulation through interviewing Professor Zhang, the
subject of the case study, his colleagues, government officials, and other university
presidents. This study also used methodological triangulation by using interviews,
archival documents, and questionnaires. The importance of using multiple sources of
evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003). In order to
compare Professor Zhang’s leadership and the development of Shenyang Jianzhu
University with what occurred at other universities in Liaoning Province, I interviewed a
number of the successful university and education leaders in Liaoning Province, most of
whom were part of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Youth League and
the Red Guard, and who are all familiar with Shenyang Jianzhu University and the work
of Professor Zhang (see Figure 3.4 for a photo of the university as it currently appears).
Peer review or debriefing provides an additional external check of the research
process by asking questions about methods and interpretations of data (Creswell, 1998).
To accomplish investigator triangulation, I asked one of my peers in the Ph.D. Program
in Leadership and Change, Dr. Peggy Marshall, who was familiar with analysis and
leadership studies, to review my data analysis.
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Figure 3.4. Shenyang Jianzhu University in 2007.
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Chapter IV: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to document how Shenyang Jianzhu University in
Shenyang, Liaoning Province, Peoples Republic of China significantly increased its size
and, as a result, has evolved into one of China’s important universities. The central focus
of this study was the leadership role of Professor Fuchang Zhang, Secretary General of
the Communist Party for the university and Communist Party leader of the university, in
the development of the university and in the building of a new campus. The research
question for the study was: Within the changing social and cultural context of post-Mao
Chinese society, how was Professor Fuchang Zhang able to significantly increase the size
and scope of Shenyang Jianzhu University by building a new campus?
The study utilized an embedded single-case study as its mode of inquiry. Data
collection involved a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Professor Zhang, his
peers, other university presidents and deans, and Chinese Communist Party government
officials in Liaoning Province. The questions were unstructured to allow emergent
responses.
Because the majority of the individuals interviewed spoke little English, a
translator was used during the interviews to allow for translation between English and
Mandarin. All interviews were electronically recorded after receiving proper oral
permission from the interviewee. A Chinese MBA student from Urbana University did
the electronic transcribing and translating of all interviews. In addition to the electronic
recordings, she produced a written transcription and translation of each interview.
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a description of the
sample that consists of 15 individual interviews of 12 interviewees. These interviewees
are further classified as the leaders of Shenyang Jianzhu University, provincial
government officials, and administrators of other universities. The second section
discusses the three dimensions that emerged from data analysis of the interviews-construction, networking, and Professor Zhang--and the key themes within each
dimension. The dimension including Professor Zhang also includes the archival data
provided by Professor Zhang in the form of a summary of the results of surveys on his
leadership abilities. The quantitative surveys include the years from 2002 to 2005.
The Sample
The sample consists of 15 unstructured interviews of 12 interviewees with the
three groups previously identified as Shenyang Jianzhu University, government officials,
and university administrators. The dates on which each interview was conducted are also
presented. The numbers attached to column one will be used as a reference for
transcripts. The letters after each number refer to the group that the interview belongs as
classified for the purposes of this dissertation.

Table 4.1.
Interviewees

Interviewee

Organization

Title

Dates

1 SJU

Shenyang Jianzhu University

Past President

July 2, 2007

2 GO

Government Official

Development Planning

July 2, 2007
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3 UA

Shenyang Polytechnic College

Dean

July 1, 2007

4 UA

Education Department

Director

July 1, 2007

Director

July 2, 2007

Director

June 29, 2007

Secretary General of

May 6, 2004

Liaoning Province
5 SJU

Department of International
Change and Cooperation,
Shenyang Jianzhu University

6 SJU

Human Resources Dept.
Shenyang Jianzhu University

7A

Shenyang Jianzhu University

the Communist Party
for Shenyang Jianzhu
University
B

Jan. 3, 2007

C

June 29, 2007

D

July 6, 2007

8 SJU

Shenyang Jianzhu University

Assistant President

July 3, 2007

9 UA

Shenyang Polytechnic College

President

July 3, 2007

10 GO

The Education and Science

Secretary

July 3, 2007

Deputy Secretary

July 3, 2007

Working Committee of the
Provincial Chinese
Communist Party
11 GO

The Education and Science
Working Committee of the
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Provincial Chinese
Communist Party
12 UA

Liaoning Technical Institute

Vice President

July 4, 2007

of Economic Management

Overview of Dimensions and Themes
The analysis of the data from the interviews led to the development of three major
dimensions, which are university construction, networking, and Professor Zhang. Further
analysis lead to themes consistent with the overall dimensions.

Table 4.2.
Overview of the Dimensions and Themes
Dimension

Theme

University Construction
The Role of Government
Funding
Networking
Communist Party
Professor Zhang
Leadership
Governance of University
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Dimension: University Construction
The central dimension that emerged for the interview data was the construction of
a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University, which took place beginning in 2001 and
was essentially completed in 2003. Overall, this dimension describes the critical
placement in history of the construction of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Although the
higher education authorities in China were requiring that the majority of the universities
build new campuses (or major campus physical additions), Shenyang Jianzhu University
was one of the first universities to do so. Not only was it one of the first universities to
build a new modern campus, but the way this project was financed and the leadership to
achieve this task was innovative given the culture of the Chinese Communist Party,
which controls such projects. Government officials had to give approval for the project
through their hierarchy, as well as permission for the construction. Approval for the
funding was also innovative because permission was given to sell the land where the old
campus was located thereby providing financing for the new campus. In addition, loans,
which were difficult to attain, were used in the financing. The two primary themes that
provide greater detail of the importance of this dimension are described along with
quotations from the transcript that support the interpreted meaning.
The role of government. During the last three decades, there has been a major
emphasis in China on building larger universities to serve the growing aspirations of the
Chinese people for higher education and to meet the needs of Chinese society in general.
Accomplishing this new and strong emphasis on building universities required major
adjustments in polices and a new type of Chinese university leader. This was not an easy
transition--especially since these changes were occurring within the context of changes in
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the regionalization of Chinese university governance (from central government control to
provincial control). In the case of Shenyang Jianzhu University, the change from central
government to Liaoning Provincial government control occurred at about the time the
decisions were made to build a new campus, so that the University had to get approval
from the Central Ministry of Development and then also attain approval by the
development unit of the province. There was also the issue that there were many
universities that needed to grow: as reported by one of the interviewees from the city of
Shenyang:
I think from the perspective of the Shenyang government, they really wanted
every university in Shenyang to develop in the future. . . . Every university leader
really wanted to move because that is a very important chance for the university
to survive. (Interviewee UA)
Within this context, Professor Zhang’s ambitious plans were not easy to accept by his
university peers:
People who report to the government [had trouble letting] Professor Zhang go,
they reported that they felt nervous with such a plan. (Interviewee UA)
And further as reported by other university presidents:
Most of the universities in Shenyang, if they do not move like that, they will have
no space and chance to develop. (Interviewee UA)
Not surprisingly, given limited resources and a mandate to increase university
presence, there were many universities who tried to follow a plan like the one devised by
Professor Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, but were not successful:
To be honest, there are many universities who failed in new campus construction.
Actually, many factors influenced the decision-making. There are three factors:
first is the trend in the country--at that time. The government supported the
development of polytechnic colleges, which offered those institutions the
opportunity for future development. Second, when they want to make a decision
to go to a new campus, the institutions select many representatives from the
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faculty members and let them vote for this decision, so this is a collective
decision. . . Third is the support of the local government. (Interviewee UA)
This university president mentioned that, in the case of Shenyang Jianzhu University:
Most of the representatives support this decision to move to a new campus. . .
[and] the local government gave them great support, so they made the decision to
do so. (Interviewee UA)
Funding. While there was a great need to expand existing universities to meet the
demand for higher education, funding this expansion was very difficult and created
serious financial problems. A university leader reported the following:
There is a university called Jilin University that is maybe one of the top ten in
China, they got a billion Yuan loan from the bank. They do not think they can pay
them back, that is the problem. From a financial perspective, I do not think that is
good for movement of the project. . . [Another institution,] Ligong University,
could not pay salaries for teachers for several months because they had no money.
My college just bought a college from Ligong University because they really
needed this money. (Interviewee UA)
Thus, many peer institutions were not able to financially make a move even if the
administration agreed that it would be advisable.
The key issue in the expansion for Shenyang Jianzhu University was the ability to
solve the funding problems by being able to sell its existing property in the central city
and to move to a new parcel of land on the outskirts of Shenyang City. The problem,
however, was that 100% of the land in China was owned by the government. The
challenge for Professor Zhang was getting the government to create a new policy that
would allow the university to sell its old campus. This type of arrangement was reported
to be unprecedented.
A new policy was created that allowed us to sell the land of the old campus at a
high price and to buy a much bigger piece of land at a much cheaper price and we
still had money to construct the project. . . At that time, the government did not
allow the university to sell their old campus to buy a new campus. Just in time, as
he [Zhang] became university leader, there is a new policy from the government
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that allows the selling of the land and buying new land. . . And the university
makes the collective decision that they will move to the new campus.
(Interviewee SJU)
It should not go unnoted that interviewees provided little information on how this
turnaround in policy occurred and how and why it coincided with Professor Zhang’s
assumption of the leadership position of the university.
But, while the sale of the land was essential for Shenyang Jianzhu University to
move to a new campus, it was not enough to fully build it. And, the government "cannot
offer this money to the University" (Interviewee GO). In fact, the government offered
only a small amount of money for the construction of the new campus. Shenyang Jianzhu
University needed a loan from a bank to augment the sale of the land and to build its new
campus.
So, there are many difficulties they had to think about before they made the
decision. . . We only sold one piece of land [of the central city campus] to cash
out. And to preserve the second piece of land as [collateral] for the business loan
from the bank, because I know the land will appreciate very fast. I do not want to
sell it so I got [a loan of] 300 million RMB. So I got enough cash to meet
immediate needs. (Interviewee B)
This quote speaks to Professor Zhang’s skills in leveraging the new policy for selling of
land against the stringent requirements for a bank loan.
While the government could not give the money to Shenyang Jianzhu University,
they did help them to get the money from the bank. Professor Zhang's ability to raise
these large amounts of money with new policies and bank loans did raise questions.
Professor Zhang states
If you want to build a new campus like us, it needs more money, and the
government cannot offer this money to the university. . . We organized one half
billion RMB to build the new campus, and some people think that there may have
been some corruption because that is a lot of money to build the new campus. But
it’s just in their imagination, they just guess. . . We could not say the government
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was against our decision, the government gave us two benefits through the change
in policy: one is that they permitted us to sell our old campus in the urban area so
we can use the money to buy the new campus, and they permitted us to loan
money from the bank. (Interviewee A)
Professor Zhang’s reference to the suspicions of corruption and his dismissal of
such suggestions tells us that the timing of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s and Professor
Zhang’s opportunity did not go without comments from others. Professor Zhang states
We organized one half billion RMB ($62.5 million) to build the new campus, and
some people believed that some leaders may be corrupt because of the lot of
money to build the new campus, but it’s is just in their imagination because in
China, there are a lot who believe that if there is a big project a lot of leaders will
be corrupt. So, they just guess the same phenomenon will happen to him.
(Interviewee A)
Summary. China is experiencing major growth in higher education. As a result of
this growth, the government is insisting that major universities move to new and larger
campuses to accommodate the needs for additional students. Professor Zhang realized
these challenges and met them by working through a government system that had put
demands on him, but, at the same time offered little help and actually had rules that
prohibited much of what he needed to accomplish. He was able to convince the
government to change some of its policies, to effectively allow the university to own the
land and then permitting the university to sell a portion of the land that belongs to the
government where the old campus was located and use the portion of land that was not
sold as collateral to obtain the additional financing needed for the development of the
new campus through bank loans.
Dimension: Networking
Professor Zhang’s ability to raise large amounts of money from many sources
represents a key part of his success. His ability to develop these financial resources is no
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doubt related to his personal skills, but is also the result of his network of associates that
he developed over the years as a result of his experiences in the Cultural Revolution, the
Red Guard, the Communist Youth League, and the Chinese Communist Party.
Communist Party. During the interviewing of his peers, it was not surprising to
learn that all of them had a similar background in that they all were members of the
Communist Party, the Red Guard, and the Chinese Communist Youth League, and knew
each other, for the most part, while being educated and developing their careers. This is
an especially important finding since the university governance structure in Chinese
universities is shared between two structures--the administrative structure of
president/vice-presidents on the one hand and the Communist Party on the other.
The Chinese higher education system is a little bit different than the American
higher education system. We follow the system that most of the important
decisions are made by Communist Party Committee of different universities and
then it is the president who carries out those duties. The president has to report his
duty and his daily work to the Party. (Interviewee A)
Not only was Professor Zhang the head of the Communist Party at the university,
but he also had long-standing relationships with many important members of the Party
and the educational establishment in Liaoning Province. Moreover, these individuals
were all members of the Red Guard and the Communist Youth League as well as leaders
in the Communist Party, which was common to most future leaders within the Chinese
university system.
During my interviews with Zhang, I specifically asked if it was necessary to be a
member of the Communist Party and to have their support to enable him to accomplish
his goals. He indicated that membership is essential for the responsible positions within
the government system and higher education, but that the Party was changing.
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This is an important factor, because the Communist Party is now accepted as a
different Party [but it] is still one Party. Other people, who may not belong to the
Communist Party, have a chance to be promoted because the Communist Party
wants to encourage the political participation of many different people. So, being
a Communist Party member is very important, but it shouldn’t be necessary. But
to be Party member you are able to achieve your goals maybe faster. (Interviewee
UA)
The Communist Party is still in charge of the government.
Professor Zhang and his peers were influenced by the Cultural Revolution. He
indicated that those who were part of the Revolution felt that, while they sacrificed part
of their lives for the Revolution, that they learned from their experiences as well. His
peers are all part of the generation that was forced into the countryside under adverse
conditions, but they considered that their experiences made them able to withstand
adversity. These shared experiences also contributed to a network of trust. Professor
Zhang discusses how these experiences impacted him and his colleagues:
After I graduated from the junior middle school, I did two and a half years of
work in the countryside because of the Culture Revolution in China. These two
and a half years of experience in the countryside was very important for me,
because this gave me a lot of experience to let me know how to do work in the
future. (Interviewee B)
One of his peers reports the following:
One can sum up the influences of the Cultural Revolution [in the following ways].
The first influence is that if we really want to make China well-developed, we’d
better begin our effort from the countryside. Only if the countryside is welldeveloped, we can say the whole of China is well-developed. With the experience
to live in the countryside so many years, it helps me to overcome any difficulty.
Difficulties now are just small cases if compared to the difficulties I faced in the
countryside. My generation thinks the Culture Revolution lasted 11 years, which
is a really long time in our lives. As one who engaged himself in the academic
field, I found that, compared with other people during the past years, I did
nothing. So I had to make a lot of effort to catch others to make up what was lost
during the eleven years. (Interviewee SJU)
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Although Professor Zhang and his peers did not comment much about their
membership in the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, the previous quotes as well
as the following ones are indicative of how their common experiences have contributed
to their leadership roles and their informal network. Zhang reports
First, I would like to talk about how I become a leader of my university. As I
mentioned to you earlier, I was a student as well as a leader of students since I
was in junior high school. At that time, China was under the Cultural Revolution
and I was a so-called Red Guard. And, even in senior high school and in
university, I was also the leader of students so those experiences helped me to
become a future leader. (Interviewee B)
He further states
Other leaders of my university have similar background and are also Party
members and Red Guard members. (Interviewee B)
The Chinese Communist Youth League was another student organization that was
linked to the Chinese Communist Party. The Youth League is an organization within the
university system dedicated to selecting students who show potential as future
government leaders. Zhang, as his peers, was a member of the Youth League. Zhang said
that “I was a student leader throughout school and belonged to the Red Guard and the
Youth League. So those experiences helped me to become a future leader.”
Another one of Zhang’s peers described Zhang’s membership in the Youth League as
follows:
He was an excellent member of the Youth League… [and] he also served as
Secretary General of the Youth League Committee in schools. (Interviewee SJU)
Summary. Professor Zhang’s ability to get policy changes within the government
so that he could sell land and then use the proceeds as collateral for a loan to build the
new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University was critical to the success of the project.
His network of peers that was established over the years was critical to his ability to ask
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for and get permission for the changes needed for his success. The interviews with these
leaders in Shenyang and Liaoning Province indicate that they all had common
experiences, trusted each other, and were part of a supportive, informal network of peers.
It is likely that his network of peers understood the activities that went on among
government officials and Professor Zhang appeared, at this point in time, more powerful
in gaining the necessary resources to build the new campus.
Dimension: Professor Zhang
The dimension of Professor Zhang is concerned with him as a leader, his personal
philosophy, and his background. Professor Zhang assumed the leadership of Shenyang
Jianzhu University in 1998 as Secretary General of the Communist Party at the
university. Professor Zhang’s leadership role is part of a two-tier system in which
Chinese universities have a president with limited powers responsible for the
administration of the university and the Communist Party leader of the university who is
responsible for the major university policy decisions to guarantee the implementation of
the Party’s principles, policies, and the state’s educational plans. The Party leader has the
highest decision-making role in each higher education institution.
Leadership. Professor Zhang was born June 12, 1956 in Dalian, Liaoning
Province. His father was an official in the local government and his mother was a worker.
He has one older sister and two younger brothers.
My older sister graduated from senior middle school and one of my brothers
graduated from senior middle school, while the other one graduated from the
same university as I did--Shenyang Architecture and Engineering University.
(Interviewee B)
Professor Zhang had a decision to make upon graduation from Shenyang Jianzhu
University: whether he would be an engineer--a profession in which he believed he could
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be very successful--or an educator. The university, then called Shenyang Architecture
and Engineering University, decided to “Keep me as an educator, so I became a teacher
at the university.”
Following his graduation, he served in a number of administrative positions in the
university’s Communist Party as well as in the administration apparatus of the university.
He describes his progression through the ranks of the university as follows:
After I graduated, I served as the Secretary of the Youth League and also the
director of the student affair office, the director of the organization department,
and the director of the propaganda department and also the director of the
President’s office, and also I served as the General Secretary of different schools
in our university.
By 1993, I was promoted as a vice president of the university. Later, I
become the Vice Secretary of the Party. The secretary is the number one person in
controlling the university. It is the government organization. So, the secretary of
the Party has more power than the president of the university. So, once again I
have been in charge in students’ activities management, logistics for the entire
university, and also the research and development of the university, which are
important sectors in the function of university.
In 1998, I was promoted to be Secretary of the Party, which is number one
in command of the university. (Interviewee B)
Being promoted to the powerful position of Secretary of the Party for the
university at the young age of 42 was very unusual. The person responsible for his
promotion said:
When he became the leader of the University, he was quite young. . . there are
few people who could become the [leader] of a university in China at this age.
(Interviewee GO)
Professor Zhang viewed the Chinese university as a “small community or
society”:
I needed to think about not only the work of teachers and students, but also to
think about the daily life of teachers and students. (Interviewee SJU)
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Common to most, if not all, Chinese universities, this meant that the university
was responsible for both the professional and personal lives of teachers and students. As
was indicated above in Professor Zhang’s statement that the university decided to “Keep
me as an educator, so I became a teacher at the university,” the university had a good deal
of control over the lives of its employees.
Following his becoming “the number one in command” of the university,
Professor Zhang believed his key role as the Party leader of the university was to ensure
the successful transition of the university from the old campus to the construction of the
new campus. While he himself was able to identify his role in this way, he did not find
that all of the members of the university accepted his ideas.
Professor Zhang tried his best to persuade the others to accept his new thinking
and help make it become a reality. And, you can see that almost all of the faculty
members are proud to be successful. But, at that time, Professor Zhang really met
with a lot of difficulties to achieve his goals. (Interviewee GO)
There are two interviewees that are of particular importance because of their
positions with the government. Both have worked extensively with Zhang and are
members of the Party that he has worked with to make the changes required for his
success. They made the following statements:
If I make a comparison between Jianzhu University and the other universities in
Liaoning Province, I would like to say it is just like difference between Professor
Zhang, who is the Secretary General of Communist Party at Jianzhu University,
and other university leaders. I found that Professor Zhang is quite dedicated in
everything he did. Whatever things he wants to do he can make it successful.
(Interviewee UL)
Among all of those directors who are in charge of the same affairs in the
universities, Professor Zhang is the person who has the distinguishing character.
(Interviewee GO)
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Governance of university. As previously written, in Chinese universities, most of
the important policy decisions were made by the Communist Party Committee and then it
was the president who carried out the decisions in this dual system. It was clear that the
Secretary General of the Communist Party for the university had the real power.
An important part of the results of this study has to do with the governance of
Shenyang Jianzhu University and how Zhang’s success is based on his ability to use his
networks and understand the use of teamwork to get what he needs to accomplish his
goals within this two-tiered system.
Also, I think that he is easy going because he works with others together and he
has the spirit of teamwork. He can work with other people harmoniously.
(Interviewee UA)
Zhang’s promotion to Secretary General of the Party for the university was very
timely in that he was given the opportunity to become Secretary when the transition from
an old campus to a new campus was being contemplated. One may question if Zhang’s
transition was timely or planned given the success of Zhang’s network.
Zhang’s rapid promotions and the timing of those promotions is important to
illustrate how Zhang used his leadership skills, networking, and political abilities to
achieve the changes needed to accomplish the task of moving Shenyang Jianzhu
University from the old campus to the new campus and significantly increasing the size
and scope of the University.
Before Zhang was promoted to Secretary General, Shenyang Architectural and
Engineering University, as it was named then, was under the administration of Professor
Chen who was President of the university. Professor Chen had been a vice president of
Shenyang University in 1993, and was promoted to the presidency in 1996. In effect,
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Professor Chen was President of the university two years before Zhang was promoted to
Secretary General of the Party for the university. An interesting question is why did
Professor Chen choose not to remain as President and be part of the move from the old
campus to the new campus? Professor Chen said
When I was promoted to President, I just told my boss that I would like to retire
from this position, but the Ministry did not accept this. I worked [as President]
until 2001; they finally agreed that I could retire from my position. (Interviewee
SJU)
Since I was born in 1948, I retired from the position of President at the time I was
53 years old. According to Chinese regulations, to be president, I can only work
until I am 60 years old. At that time, if I still wanted to be president I could work
seven years more before I retired, but I loved my subject very much; I loved
architecture very much. If I still served as president of the university, that would
occupy a lot of my time that I could use to do my research. I wanted time to do
my own research before my retirement. That is real reason why I retired from
president. (Interviewee SJU)
It is hard work to be a Chinese university president. (Interviewee SJU)
Professor Chen, besides retiring before the move from the old campus to the new
campus also had reservations about the wisdom of the move. One of Professor Chen’s
peers said:
Professor Chen asked to retire from the president’s position because to build a
new campus, a bank loan was needed [but] it may be a risk for the university
because if we cannot move successfully then we cannot have our salary because
we owe the bank so much in loans. (Interviewee UA)
He faced the problems for finance, also the Ministry of Construction because at
that time, the Ministry had just taken over the affairs of [local] institutions.
(Interviewee UA)
Professor Chen indicated, during his interview, that he was especially concerned
about the faculty in the context of their having jobs and the ability to pay them if this
move to a new campus was to happen.
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As a result of Professor Chen’s retirement in 2001, Professor Zhang was in the
position to use his network of people and team building to orchestrate the move from the
old campus to the new campus. In effect, Professor Zhang was both Secretary General of
the Communist Party of the University as well as President, albeit informally. But
Professor Zhang faced many difficulties.
First, the Ministry of Construction must approve the development of a university
belonging to the provincial government. Then, the government must evaluate a
general plan. Also, there must be an approval from the Shenyang Government.
Then, you must send an application to the local government and get approval.
(Interviewee UA)
The application and planning processes were just a few of the development issues
that Zhang faced. He also faced other issues in the opinions of government officials.
People who report to the government feel nervous and do not want to let Professor
Zhang go [forward]. They just feel nervous with such a plan because, if such a
plan failed, they [did not want to be responsible]. (Interviewee UA)
Describing Zhang’s leadership ability, a member of the Liaoning Provincial
Communist Party apparatus stated:
Among all of those in charge of the affairs in the universities, Professor Zhang is
the person who has the distinguishing character. . . [and] he also uses efforts to
build up the faculty teams and to [solicit] innovative ideas. (Interviewee UA)
Professor Zhang always thinks about how to persuade the others to accept his
concept. (Interviewee UA)
Finally, I asked Professor Zhang about his future beyond being Secretary General
of the University. Zhang replied
To be honest, until now, I did not get an official invitation to be promoted from
the government, but I think the responsibility [now] is to make the university
better. (Interviewee C)
Summary. The main part of this study is the leadership role of Professor Fuchang
Zhang, the Communist Party leader of the university, in the development of the

63
university and in the building of a new campus. As reported by his peers in higher
education in Liaoning Province, Professor Zhang has achieved what few other university
leaders within the Chinese higher education system have been able to do. He has met the
goal of the Chinese Communist Party to expand their university system even against the
obstacles that the Party itself had in place and to do so without creating financial
difficulties for the university.
Archival Data
Beyond the interviews of the 12 higher education leaders in Liaoning Province, I
was able to secure four years of data from the Communist Party questionnaires that are
used to assess the performance of institutional leaders. While the data is limited by the
Party’s refusal to release the questions used in the questionnaire, Professor Zhang
provided permission for the results to be used in this study. The questionnaires are given
to the faculty and administrators of Shenyang Jianzhu University annually. The surveys
are sets of questionnaires from 2002 through 2005 of Professor Zhang’s performance as a
leader. The questionnaires were administered by the Chinese Communist Party to survey
its leaders’ capabilities.
The trends from the data indicate that, between the years 2002 through 2005,
Professor Zhang’s performance as a leader improved. In 2002, his score in the
“excellent” category was 114, or 66.3%. In 2003, his score in the “excellent” category
was 137, or 71.7%. In 2004, his score in the “excellent” category was 140, or 77.8%.
Finally, in 2005, his score in the “excellent” category was 143, or 77.3%.
Generally, his peers viewed Zhang as an increasingly strong leader each year over
the four years surveyed, which coincides with the timeline when Zhang was moving
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Shenyang Jianzhu University from the old campus to the new campus. Unfortunately, I
do not have data prior to the time Professor Zhang made his move to a new campus to
compare what his leadership scores were. In fact, that data may not exist since the
archival surveys are questionnaires about university leaders. But, it would be an
interesting comparison.

Table 4.3.
Archival Data
Year

Total

Excellent

Qualified

Unqualified

Blank

2002

172

114

46

10

2

2003

191

137

42

7

5

2004

180

140

34

6

0

2005

185

143

29

5

3
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Chapter V: Discussion
Introduction
This chapter represents a discussion of findings from the case study as they relate
to Shenyang Jianzhu University successfully making a move from an old campus
environment to a new campus and Professor Zhang’s role as the leader during this
transition. The findings were derived from 12 interviews. Empirical data from the
interviews led to the development of three major dimensions, which are university
construction, networking, and Professor Zhang. In addition, there are four years of
surveys using Communist Party questionnaires that are used to assess the performance of
institutional leaders.
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I described a brief history of Chinese higher
education to help the reader understand the context in which Shenyang Jianzhu
University developed and, briefly, the nature of the governance structure of Chinese
universities--which is a dual-structure based on the Communist Party interests and the
operations of the university. The study also dealt with the history of Shenyang Jianzhu
University and the major events in the development of the new campus, which is the
primary focus of this research, along with the relationship between Professor Fuchang
Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, and how he led the physical development of the
university.
The following is a discussion of the major findings of this study:
1. the governmental policy changes that supported the building of Shenyang
Jianzhu University’s new campus
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2. Professor Zhang’s role as a leader in capitalizing on the opportunities to
rebuild Shenyang Jianzhu University
3. the role of Professor Zhang’s connection to leaders in the Liaoning
government and Communist Party in his success at Shenyang Jianzhu
University.
Shenyang Jianzhu University. First, it is important to provide a context for this
study by examining Shenyang Jianzhu University within the higher education movement
in China from Mao through the end of the Cultural Revolution. Following the end of the
Cultural Revolution and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping as the Chinese leader, there was
a major shift in the economic philosophy of China. The entrepreneurial spirit of the
Chinese was encouraged, free enterprise zones were created, and, along with the
investment of Western companies in cheap labor, China became a major economic
power.
This quasi-free market economy, privately-owned companies combined with
state-owned companies, fueled the economy and significantly increased the aspirations of
the Chinese people. A key aspect of these new aspirations included a sharply increased
emphasis on university education which, along with the suppression of university
attendance in the Cultural Revolution, led to great increases in students seeking higher
education.
Guorui (2006) writes
. . .the market economy has increasingly become a fact that cannot be ignored in
China’s economic life. People have opened their minds to these facts and, for the
first time since the founding of the People’s Republic, have listed education and
the socialist market economy as important. (p. 36)
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This, in turn, necessitated massive increases in the physical capacity of
universities to serve these students. Along with major structural changes occurring
through the consolidation of many institutions and the decentralizing of many universities
from the central government to provincial governments, the increase in the number of
students was very impressive. Wei (2005) writes that “Nationwide in 2002, there were
9,034,000 students at ordinary higher education institutions, a 7.8 fold increase over 1982
(1,158,205) and a 4.1 fold increase over 1992 (2,203,415)” (p. 11). These enrollment
numbers are further confirmed by Pan (2007) who wrote “Regular institutions of higher
learning grew in terms of number of students from 2.29 million in 1992 to 3.35 million in
1997, a 47 percent increase in five years” (p. 77).
The key to this enormous change in enrollments at Chinese universities was the
government policy of 1999, which created a nine-year plan to increase access to Chinese
higher education. Shenyang Jianzhu University, like much of the rest of Chinese higher
education, participated in these massive changes. In many ways, Shenyang Jianzhu
University was a leader and model for how a university could build a large physical
capacity in a very short period of time through the creative and, at times, ingenious
leadership of Professor Zhang. While many universities began to make significant
changes in their physical capacity in the 1990s and early first decade of the 21st century,
a good number had trouble getting the necessary financial resources to build their
campuses and that created serious problems for them.
Changes in Chinese universities. As described in chapter 4, a university leader in
Liaoning Province reported that:
. . .some universities that built new campuses‚ borrowed a lot of money from the
bank and now they have a lot of bank debt that I do not think they could pay back.
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Ligong University could not pay salaries for teachers for several months because
they had no money. My college just bought a college from Ligong University
because they really needed this money; they have no money to pay everything.
(Interviewee UA)
There is a university called Jilin University that is maybe one of the top ten in
China, they got a billion Yuan from the bank. They do not think they can pay
them back, that is the problem. (Interviewee UA)
To be honest, there are many universities who failed in new campus construction.
Actually many factors influenced the decision-making. There are three factors:
first is the trend in the country--at that time the government supported the
development of polytechnic colleges, which offered those institutions the
opportunity for future development. Second, when they wanted to make a
decision to go to a new campus, the institutions selected many representatives
from the faculty members and let them vote for this decision, so this is a
collective decision. . . Third, is the support of the local government. (Interviewee
UA)
The physical growth of Shenyang Jianzhu University required a combination of a
change in Chinese government policy toward the ownership of the land on which the
university was located and the creative use of the land in order to amass the necessary
financial resources to build a new campus. The building of Shenyang Jianzhu University
also required the collective decision of the employees at the University and the trust they
had to have in Professor Zhang.
Professor Zhang. As discussed in chapter 4, Professor Zhang assumed the
leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University in 1998 as Secretary General of the
Communist Party at the university. Professor Zhang’s leadership role was part of a twotier system in which Chinese universities have a president and the Communist Party
leader of the university who is responsible for the major university policy decisions. The
Party leader has the highest decision-making role in each higher education institution.
The key issues in trying to understand why Professor Zhang was so successful in
creating a model that others may follow relate to his leadership style and his ability to
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energize his network of colleagues in Liaoning Province. In chapter 2, I discussed how
Professor Zhang’s networking was based on his elite status in the Communist Party.
Professor Zhang’s leadership success, in many ways, is the result of the paradoxical style
common to many successful leaders. On the one hand, he is a strong, tough leader who is
capable of taking full control of the university leadership--both the Chinese Communist
Party (his formal role) and, informally, the administrative apparatus; on the other hand,
he is a team player, is persuasive, and is a dynamic entrepreneurial leader who seems to
create a great deal of trust in his Party and Liaoning Province peers. Combining these two
sides together, this paradoxical leadership seems to have led to his success in the difficult
political environment he faced. His success seems to have been the result of the support
of his powerful network of peers, who went through the difficulties they had in the Red
Guard and Cultural Revolution and their sacrifices together. While there is no direct
evidence of this last comment on the trust that Zhang’s network developed in each other
and how it was directly related to Zhang’s success, I feel that there is enough information
presented in the interviews to reach this interpretation.
However, not all interviews were cordial. One interviewee who was a university
administrator was exceptionally nervous. His physical appearance was that of perspiring
heavily and very nervous. He avoided directly answering as many questions as possible.
He did not want to be interviewed as evidenced by his indicating that he accepted the
request only because it was from Professor Zhang. A second interviewee was hostile. He
questioned my asking questions that specifically pertained to the Communist Party and
expounded the Party’s ideology. However, both interviewees did cooperate and added
significant data to my research.
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Alluto and Hrebiniak (as cited in Bass, 1990) learned that
. . .some people enjoy taking risks, but others do not. Such preferences and
behavior affect leadership that emerges. Older leaders were found generally more
conservative and more likely to avoid taking risks. They want more information
and higher probabilities of success and may be content with lower payoffs as a
consequence. (p. 149)
This contrast between the younger Professor Zhang and the older Professor Chen seems
to reflect these differences in risk taking behavior.
Another important issue in Professor Zhang’s success is that, in 1999, the Chinese
government made a significant policy change to rapidly expand the capacity of
universities to enroll students. This major policy shift coincided with Zhang’s assumption
of his role as the Secretary General of the Communist Party at Shenyang Jianzhu
University and, a short time later, the resignation of Chen as President. Zhang was seen
by his peers as a rising star in the leadership of universities--he was very young to assume
his post--and the sense one gets from the interviews with Zhang, as well as his peers and
his direct superior, is that Zhang is a strong, forceful, and charismatic leader. While
Chinese cultural etiquette may well have not permitted Zhang to state how he was able to
jump at the opportunity to initiate change at the University (as well as possibly
encouraging Chen to resign), it may well be that Zhang’s entrepreneurial, collaborative,
and charismatic leadership style matched the evolving events in Chinese higher
education, and, thereby, enabled him to be at the right place at the right time--whether
this was coincidence or planned by his powerful peers is not clear. What is clear is that
Zhang grabbed the moment and made the most of it. It is also important to note that
while Zhang did not tell me all he did--and I am sure there were a great many tough
decisions and obstacles--he was, as is common to many successful leaders, very confident
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that he was a great success. Not only was he willing to share his high marks from his
university colleagues over the period of 2002 through 2005, but he also said that he
would give himself a 95% success score.
Post Mao Chinese context. The nature of Zhang’s leadership occurred within the
changing Chinese environment and, what I would at least call, the conflicting economic
and political environment of present day China. On the other hand, the Chinese
government emphasizes and strongly encourages the economically entrepreneurial
behavior of its citizens and government departments within a relatively open-market
economic perspective. In effect, the Chinese government is fostering freedom of
economic expression and seeking to become a global economic power while still
maintaining a political system that restricts political expression.
There is a serious question about whether China will be able to continue this
separation of economic and political expression. The story of Shenyang Jianzhu
University and the numerous other Chinese universities that are building major increases
in their enrollment capacity and in attendance leads one to wonder whether the Chinese
government and Party apparatus will be able to continue its political suppression. The
government is facing a largely novel context of vast numbers of newly educated citizens
who have an opportunity to work in businesses that are independent of the direct control
of the Party and the government.
Tiananmen Square represented a refusal of the Party and government in 1989 to
accept a more open political environment. Another reason for the uprising at Tiananmen
Square is expressed by Zhao (1996), indicating that the difficulties of students going
abroad for their university education was a major grievance:
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Since 1978, a large number of Chinese university students have gone to Western
countries, especially to North America. This . . .widespread phenomenon of going
abroad provided an important alternative for aggrieved university students, and
the increased difficulty for Chinese university students to go abroad in the late
eighties was one of the major grievances of Chinese students on the eve of the
1989 Chinese Student Movement. (p. 145)
It is possible for one to also presume that the combination of the lack of capacity
of university education at home combined with the restriction on studying abroad
continued to be a problem for the Chinese government. In the 1990s, as the economy of
China started to develop in a powerful way, one can imagine that this lack of capacity in
Chinese higher education was a major problem for people seeking university level
education (especially given the suppression of university education during the Cultural
Revolution) as well as an economy that needed such education for its continued growth.
The change in government policy in 1999 reflects these needs and pressures.
The article referred to above (Zhao, 1996) was written three years before the new
Chinese government higher education growth policy and two years before Zhang became
the leader of Shenyang Jianzhu University. In 1997, there were 3.4 million students
attending Chinese universities; by 2002, there were over 9 million students attending
universities (Zhao, 1996). While this huge increase in enrollments seems, from my
perspective, to be a desirable change, like all such major societal and institutional
changes, there may well be unintended (by the Chinese Communist Party and
government) major shifts in the social and cultural environment--especially if it
continues.
It may well be that the next challenge for Zhang and his colleagues is to deal with
the outcomes--intended and unintended--of their successful building of the enrollment
capacity of Chinese universities. How will the graduates of Shenyang Jianzhu University
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deal with their increased economic status? Will they continue to support the expression
of their economic interests while accepting the repression of their political expression as
presently exists? Will the Chinese Communist Party continue to evolve, as was indicated
in the responses of a number of interviewees, by admitting non-Party members into
important leadership positions? Will Chinese leaders like Zhang--who is still quite young
by Chinese leadership standards--be able to make a major shift in the political
environment of the country as Deng did in the economic arena? Will the sophistication,
entrepreneurialism, and courage--as well as charisma and strength-- that led Zhang to be
so successful at Shenyang Jianzhu University enable him to take on a larger role in the
Chinese government and begin developing the complex and difficult answers to these
struggles in China as it emerges as a major international player in this global economic
world?
Limitations of the Study
There are many limitations of the study that are related to my personal friendship
with Professor Zhang, to my professional relationship with Professor Zhang and
Shenyang Jianzhu University, as well as to the methodology.
Interview data limitations include the possibility that the observer may affect the
situation being observed in unknown ways. Interview limitations include possibly
distorted responses due to personal bias (Patton, 2002). There are personal friendships
and professional relationships involved in this study among the interviewees, which may
have easily provided a one-sidedness to the data and which may affect bias.
An important limitation is the relationship between Urbana University and
Shenyang Jianzhu University. I met Professor Zhang while I was recruiting students from

74
China for my university’s MBA program. I was working with Li Ji Ning, the Director of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) for Eastern China, to recruit young adults within
government, business, and industry in the city of Shenyang, Liaoning Province. The local
government also wanted us to establish professional relationships with the local
universities to extend our recruiting efforts to students as well. Mrs. Luo Shaomei,
Director of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province, arranged a meeting with
Zhao Chang Yi, Mayor of Shenyang City who sanctioned our work with the WTO. He
expressed his desire for us to expand our recruitment to local universities. Mrs. Luo
decided that Shenyang Jianzhu University, because it represented a progressive example
of a Chinese university, would be the first group to meet. Those introductions led to a
personal friendship with Professor Zhang and a professional relationship with Shenyang
Jianzhu University.
Although these personal and professional relationships exist and the reader must
take them into account, they do not, I believe, preclude the significance of this research.
My work with Professor Zhang gave me insight into what I consider his extraordinary
leadership skills and accomplishments within the restrictive environment of the
Communist Party system of governance.
Although my access was closed, as a Westerner, to the Communist Party and was
dependent on Professor Zhang, I earned Professor Zhang’s trust. His trust led to
discussions about my research of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s move from its old
campus to its new campus, which had just occurred and was much of the discussion
within the local government at the time. Also, Professor Zhang’s leadership of the move
was an equally important part of the local discussion. I asked Professor Zhang if he
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would agree to let me research and write a case study about Shenyang Jianzhu University
and his leadership of the university. He agreed, but only after he informed me that he had
been asked to be interviewed by the Chinese and foreign press, but had declined. He
believed that this research would be important for Shenyang Jianzhu University and the
Chinese higher education system. As part of the study, it was also Professor Zhang who,
at my request, arranged my interviews. While this study is based on a significant
opportunity, which also could have led to bias in who was interviewed and what I was
told, I thought it was important to undertake because of the unique access I was given. It
is up to the reader to assess whether the results and my interpretation of them provide a
deeper understanding of some aspects of Chinese higher education.
The methodology of the study also provided significant limitations. I do not read,
write, or speak Mandarin. Because this study is about a Chinese educational leader and an
institution in China, cross-cultural interviewing is an issue. Patton (2002) writes
Cross-cultural inquires add layers of complexity to the already complex
interactions of an interview. The possibility for misunderstandings is
significant. . . miscommunications [are] harder to detect because of false
assumptions about shared meanings. The situation becomes more precarious when
a translator or interpreter must be used. . . [as] translators need to understand
what, precisely, you want them to ask and that you will need full and complete
translation of responses as verbatim as possible. (pp. 391-392)
All interviews were electronically recorded, transcribed, and translated. While a
Shenyang Jianzhu University translator, from their International Department, was
assigned to accompany me and translate my interviews, I do have the original notes taken
in Mandarin, as well as my notes that were further translated by a different person. All
electronically recorded interviews were also translated by a different person.
Additionally, there is archival data that adds to the research.
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Finally, all data analysis of the interviews and attributing meaning to the research
and the results are filtered through my lens as a Westerner of male Caucasian heritage.
However, I have had previous experience within the Asian culture with the Vietnam War
and previously conducting business in Hong Kong and Macao, which does contribute
somewhat to my understanding.
I submit my dissertation and understanding of the building of the Shenyang
Jianzhu University and Professor Zhang’s leadership with great humility and awareness
that it tells only one small part of the university’s and of Professor Zhang’s journey.
Significance of the Study
Given the limitations of this study, I still chose to do the study because the access
that I had gave me an unprecedented, unique look at how some significant changes have
occurred in China’s higher educational system. Further, with my access, I was able to
explore how a successful university leader can operate in the Chinese political system,
which seems opposed to such significant institutional change.
Conclusions
The move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from its old campus to its new campus
encountered controversy from government officials who had to approve such a move.
They believed that procuring loans based on the sale of land and encountering debt was
not necessary. The evidence from this study suggests that selling the land and avoiding
unsecured debt was important. The success of Shenyang Jianzhu University is that it did
move to a new campus and the success of the move is the result of Professor Zhang’s
leadership ability.
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Focusing on Professor Zhang and his powerful role in building the new campus of
Shenyang Jianzhu University becomes understandable in the context of the
administration of Professor Chen, who was President of the university from 1996 to
2001. President Chen was reluctant to make the move from an old campus to a new
campus for the university. Because he had reservations about the wisdom of such a move,
Chen had asked the Ministry of Education for permission to retire; he wanted to pursue
his goals of developing the Architectural department of the University. His retirement
was denied until 2001, when the Ministry approved.
As a result of Professor Chen’s retirement in 2001, Professor Zhang was in the
position to use his network of people and team building to orchestrate the move from the
old campus to the new campus. In effect, Professor Zhang was both Secretary General of
the Communist Party of the University as well as President, albeit informally. This was
the opportunity that allowed the move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from an old
campus to a new campus.
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